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I. Introduction 
The spread of the recent financial crisis from the United States to Europe and shows the 
breadth and depth of globalization in financial markets.  As the as crisis has deepened and 
persisted in Europe, some national governments have fallen under tremendous fiscal strain.  The 
resulting poor sovereign credit ratings and high interest rates on government bonds have 
challenged these countries while the European Union as a whole works to stave off sovereign 
defaults and recapitalize banks.  Spain is one such country facing economic recession and tight 
government financing constraints.  Interestingly, Spain today has a smaller debt-to-GDP ratio 
than the United States, yet suffers record high yields on their bonds while the U.S. continues 
paying lenders comparatively low yields (Amaral and Jacobsen, 2011). 
If the factors directly associated with government credibility such as the debt ratio are 
misleading, what are investors considering when they invest in government securities?  In Europe, 
the financial crisis and threat of a Greek default have left some banks undercapitalized and at risk 
of failure.  Furthermore, investors have seen large state interventions in support of the financial 
sector, as in the case of Ireland in September 2008 (Amaral and Jacobsen, 2011).  From these 
two considerations, investors may be drawing a connection between banks’ exposures to foreign 
claims, their financial vulnerability should those foreign debtors default, and state commitments 
to bolster banks through deficit spending to guarantee bank deposits and inject capital in an effort 
to stabilize the industry.   
While there has been a great deal of investigation into sovereign credit ratings, yields, and 
yield spreads, particularly in the European Union and among developing nations, none have 
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explicitly considered banking sectors’ foreign exposures.  This paper will seek to test the 
hypothesis that the foreign claims of euro zone commercial banking sectors affect their 
governments’ bond yields.  In so doing, I will next review the relevant literature to contextualize 
my investigation and identify influences on my theory.  The subsequent section will present a 
theoretical conceptualization of the relationship between bond prices and government bond 
yields. The fourth section will present information on summary statistics from a sample of 11 
euro zone countries.  Sections 5 and 6 will encompass the results and robustness checks of the 
analysis and the final section will discuss the conclusions of the investigation. 
 
II. Review of Literature on Bond Yield Spreads 
The empirical literature has generally established three overarching factors in the 
determination of yield spreads: a country’s credit risk, investors’ general risk aversion, and asset 
liquidity.    
A credit risk factor is any factor that directly affects a government’s ability to service its 
debts.  Most studies of bond yield spreads agree that the ratios of debt and deficit-to-GDP are 
significant predictors of yield spread.  Cantor and Parker (1996) used cross-sectional data on 49 
countries from 1995 and they noted that the variables used by ratings agencies to assign 
sovereign credit ratings would also be predictive of yield spreads.  They found GDP growth, 
inflation, per capita income, external debt indicators of default history and economic 
development to be significant explanatory variables for yield spreads.
1
  In the euro zone, 
however, many researchers have found deficit and debt alone account for sufficient variance in 
bond yield spreads and are the most important credibility factors in determining risk premia and 
hence bond yield spreads (Attinasi et al, 2009; Broos and de Haan, 2012; von Hagen et al, 2011).   
                                                        
1 Two serious limitations of their study were that by including agency credit rating directly, the significance of other 
variables may have been masked and their data was only cross-sectional and traced no evolution in spreads through time.   
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Investigators have also recently considered aggregate national banking assets and 
banking equity to assets as credibility factors in the determining yield spreads.  Gerlach et al 
found when debt and deficit increase, countries with large banking sectors and low equity ratios 
experience a greater yield spread as investors envision bank rescues financed by state deficit 
spending (2010). Other research has found higher equity levels in particular have a significant 
negative effect on spreads in the euro zone (Klepsch and Wollmerhäuser, 2011).  The argument 
for the inclusion of variables for these banking statistics stems from the recent financial crisis; 
should several major banks fail, states will rescue the industry and the subsequent deficit 
spending and higher public debt then lead to a widening in sovereign bond spreads.  Some 
researchers, while again corroborating the evidence that deficit and debt ratios affect yield 
spreads, find that the effect of these variables increases the more the debt issued by a government 
is foreign-owned (Broos and de Haan, 2012).  Broos and de Haan argue that at high levels of 
indebtedness, foreign ownership of the government’s bonds will increase the sensitivity of bond 
yields to the debt ratio.  
 The second theoretical factor influencing yield spreads is general risk aversion.  In times 
of financial turmoil, investors often turn to relatively safer liquid assets as opposed to long-term 
government bonds (Schuknecht et al, 2009).  In other words, investors become more risk averse 
in times of financial turmoil, which requires countries to raise yields to sell their bonds.  Many 
studies use indicators of financial conditions in the United States financial markets to measure 
general risk aversion and find they have significant impacts on bond yield spreads.   Codogno et 
al (2003) and Attinasi et al (2009) find the spread between the yields on Moody’s Seasoned 
AAA U.S. corporate bonds and 10-year U.S. government bonds have a significant positive 
impact on yield differentials between euro zone government bonds.  Schuknecht et al (2009) use 
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the same measure, but with BBB bonds instead and also find it significant.  Recently, Klepsch 
and Wollmerhäuser (2011) implemented the VIX index, which measures the volatility of the 
U.S. equity market, as a proxy variable for risk aversion.  They argue this indicator reflects best 
the increase in investing risk and aversion due to the 2008 financial crisis and found this measure 
to have a significant and positive effect before and especially after the financial crisis. 
Much investigation has explored the role of liquidity in bond markets, the third 
theoretical factor influencing yield spreads.  In liquid markets, investors face low transaction 
costs and may trade their assets frequently.  As liquidity decreases, investors will demand a 
compensation for the risk of being unable to make timely low-cost trades and therefore yields 
will climb higher.  Some studies represent the relative liquidity of bonds with bid-ask spreads 
and the volume of government bonds outstanding and find such variables are as or more 
significant than credit factors (Gómez-Puig, 2006; Beber et al, 2009).  Codogno et al (2003) 
additionally used the trading volume and the raw quantity of bonds available at the bid and ask 
prices as proxy indicators of liquidity, where a higher trading volume or market size suggests 
greater liquidity and less risk to investors.  Codogno et al, however, found none of their 
indicators of liquidity to be statistically significant, although trading volume was their strongest 
estimator.  One explanation for the lack of significant findings in the Codogno et al analysis 
could be multicollinearity among these liquidity variables.  Overall, the size of government bond 
markets (measured by the total amount of sovereign debt issuance as a fraction of all debt issued 
in a sample) is a common measure of liquidity which has a significant positive effect on bond 
spreads (Bernoth, 2004; Gómez-Puig, 2006; Attinasi et al, 2009). 
The influences of liquidity factors and general risk aversion factors are well-established, 
as is the effect of the debt and deficit-to-GDP ratio.  Less well-understood, are the relationships 
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between the banking industry, globalization, and government bond yields.  My paper seeks to 
expand this knowledge by following the argument of Gerlach et al (2010) and considering the 
results of Broos and de Haan (2012).  Like Gerlach et al (2010), I expect that the banking sectors 
pose risks to national governments and that investors expect governments to rescue or relieve 
banks during times of financial crisis (see Gerlach et al, 11).  Similar to Broos and de Haan, I 
also expect that increased globalization and foreign financing enhance the effects of banking and 
credibility risks on bond yields.  This investigation aims to expand these two areas of yield 
determination research by considering the effect of the banking industries’ foreign claims on the 
respective government’s bond yields.  This paper will also consider the size of government bond 
markets as a measure of liquidity, and its impact on bond spreads.  The next section will 
illustrate how credibility factors, liquidity, and general risk aversion play a role in the 
determination of bond yield spreads. 
 
III. Theory 
What determines the yield of bonds is how much investors expect they will earn from the 
bond or the yield to maturity.
2
  The risk of default, the potential costs of making bond 
transactions, and the general perceived risk in financial markets decrease this expected bond 
yield.   
Consider an international capital market of investors and borrowers in which investors 
are lenders and sovereign national governments are borrowers.  Assume that investors’ goal is to 
maximize returns on their investment (loan) while governments intend to sell bonds (borrow) 
such that they meet an exogenous financing target.  In other words, the amount of securities 
                                                        
2
 “The effective interest rate that a bondholder will earn if the bond is held until maturity. Yield-to-maturity takes into 
account the bond’s purchase price, its current market price, the coupon rate, which is the interest rate that the bond pays, 
and the amount of time remaining until the bond matures. Yield-to-maturity is the most accurate representation of how 
much a bond [sic] will actually receive if the bond is held until maturity” (“Yield-to-maturity”). 
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issued at any given time is inelastic and only investors’ demand for bonds determines their 
market interest rate.  Investors demand is solely determined by the probability of receiving the 
full yield to maturity of a bond.  In an ideal world, all government bonds are identical and 
governments will sell all bonds necessary at risk free interest rates to meet a financing goal.  
Additionally in this ideal world, investors will expect to receive Y on all government bonds, or 
all of what they invest plus the interest earned on that investment. 
[1]           
Suppose, however, that sovereign government bonds are no longer identical and some are 
subject to default risk such that these governments have a probability of default of       , 
where          and   is a set of variables affecting the chances of default. Thus the 
expected yield on risk bearing country i’s becomes: 
[2]                       
Additionally, the investor knows bonds have some amount of liquidity,  , where higher 
liquidity implies a higher expected yield for the investor.  This is strictly in the sense that the 
investor may maximize their returns by approaching the expected yield to maturity should they 
trade the bond before maturation.  Thus this variable has a positive relationship to yield. 
[3]                         
To consider a yield spread, we compare the yield of a risk-bearing bond to a bond 
considered risk free and perfectly liquid.  In the euro zone context, German bonds are 
traditionally assumed to be the perfectly liquid, risk free bond.  The expected return on the risky 
bond was presented in equation [3]; the expected return of the risk free bond (German) is as 
follows: 
[4]              
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Therefore the difference in the expected return between Germany and country i’s bonds 
becomes: 
[5]                                   
or after division and substitution, 
         
     
  
             
  
  
 
Now the general risk aversion,  , of investors is added, which will positively impact the 
expected yields of all financial assets as investors become more pessimistic.  In particular, it will 
increase the spread in expected yields as German bonds will still be risk free relative to all other 
bonds.  Lastly, to complete the theoretical equation, I add i and t subscripts to represent the 
variables for each country i at time t. 
        
       
   
              
   
   
      
The left-hand side term of the equation expresses the yield differential between the 
foreign     and German bond    , or the difference between what the investor would have taken 
home by investing in a riskless German versus another foreign bond.  The expression   
           is the yield premium over German securities resulting from default risk.  The third 
term on the right-hand side reflects the premium on liquidity, and the last term represents the 
investors’ general risk aversion.  Essentially, for governments to sell their exogenously 
determined amount of bonds, they must raise interest rates, r, and thus expected yields, to 
compensate for the added risk and lower liquidity of their bonds relative to the benchmark 
German bond.  In other words, governments must pay the credit risk, liquidity, and risk aversion 
premia in the form of higher yields to sell their bonds. 
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As the right-hand side parameters of the equation cannot be measured directly, they must 
be represented with proxy variables based on empirical work.  These parameters are government 
fiscal performance or credibility factors, a liquidity factor, and a general risk aversion factor.  
Consider domestic banks’ foreign claims, the experimental variable, as one such credibility 
factor. 
Countries whose banks have a large amount of foreign claims will experience higher 
bond yields because there is greater risk of state bank rescues or reliefs.  If the economy in a 
borrowing country undergoes a drastic contraction, borrowers may default on their loans.  The 
risk of such an occurrence increases with the number of countries to whom a bank lends 
(especially in the case of a recessionary contagion) and with the extent to which each additional 
country is economically unreliable.  The defaults may be unsustainable for the lending 
institutions and they may need government rescue, and therefore the probability that state rescue 
packages will be implemented increases.  Governments in Europe in the past several years have 
been willing to rescue banks, which increases deficit and debt-to-GDP ratios.  Investors 
financing bank relief measures ultimately view these governments as less capable of servicing 
their debt and will not invest unless they are paid a premium for the additional risk with higher 
bond yields.  Investors may anticipate this risk if they see a nation’s banks more or less heavily 
exposed to the risk of default on their foreign loans.   
It follows from the literature to include the government deficit-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-
GDP ratio (debt) as credibility factors in estimating bond yields.  For simplification in bringing 
the theory to the data, however, I will consider government surplus instead of deficit, where a 
negative surplus is a positive deficit.  These are direct factors that play into the risk of 
government default because a high debt-to-GDP or low surplus-to-GDP ratio (surplus) increases 
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the probability that governments will be unable to pay their debts and would therefore increase 
bond yields.  As in calculating a yield spread, these values will be made relative to Germany by 
subtracting the contemporaneous values for all other countries.  This measure is more 
meaningful in the euro zone context and is closer to what investors likely consider in their choice 
to invest.  It is important to note that the expected sign for the surplus coefficient in the estimated 
equation for yield spread is positive, while for foreign claims and debt the expected sign is 
negative.  In summary, we have defined the x variables of the theoretical equation as follows. 
                                               
The remaining factors are liquidity and investors’ general risk aversion.  The liquidity 
factor will be represented by the aggregate euro value of securities issued by country i at time t 
as a fraction of the total value of all bonds issued by countries i and Germany at time t.  This is 
thought to capture the size and efficiency of the bond market.  The more debt in bonds a country 
issues, the larger and more efficient its capital markets are, the less costly it will be to trade those 
bonds, and therefore the lower the yield spread from Germany will be.  As a proxy for general 
risk aversion, I will follow the method used by Klepsch and Wollmerhäuser (2011) and use the 
VIX, which measures the volatility of the U.S. equity market constructed from call and put 
volatilities from S&P 500 index options.
3
  The greater the VIX, the greater the volatility in the 
U.S. equity market, and the more risk averse investors will be, implying higher government bond 
yields.  The expected signs of these variables’ coefficients are negative and positive, 
respectively. 
                                                                     
                                                        
3 Put and call options refer to stock options wherein the bearer will buy (call option) stock at a certain price or before a 
particular date or sell (put option) stock within an agreed time at a specific price. 
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As can be observed in the data studied in this paper and in the literature, the 2008 
financial crisis brings about a paradigm shift in yield spread estimation.  With the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September of that year and announcements of large state rescues of 
endangered financial institutions within the euro zone, yield spreads reached historic highs.  To 
account for the unique influence of the crisis and subsequent turbulence, I will add a time 
dummy for the crisis beginning in the third quarter of 2008 and expect that its coefficient’s sign 
will be positive to indicate the increase in bond yield spreads during that period.   
With the variables now clarified, the initial spread equation, [7], can be simplified into 
the following reduced form guiding equation for OLS estimation.   
                                                        
                                              
    is the difference in yield between Germany and the i-th country’s bonds at time t, and 
  is the constant term, and   is the stochastic error term.  The next section will describe the data 
used for the above variables. 
 
IV. Summary Statistics 
To estimate the guiding equation, we need data for each variable in the equation for each 
country in the euro zone over the chosen time range and at a synchronized frequency.   The 
sample I use consists of quarterly observations of these variables from the fourth quarter of 2003 
to the third quarter of 2011.  The countries represented in the sample are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
At the heart of this investigation are the data representing the aggregate foreign claims of 
domestic banks and the domestic credit extended by banks.  Together, these two statistics can be 
combined in a ratio for a reasonable indicator of the relative amount of foreign exposure 
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domestic banking sectors have in the euro zone.  This indictor allows for meaningful 
comparisons between national banking industries and contains the information that is 
hypothesized to influence investors’ investment decisions and therefore bond yields.  Ideally, 
these data would come at quarterly frequency for all members of the euro zone and claims would 
be ultimate risk basis.  Ultimate risk basis means that claims are allocated to the country where 
the ultimate risk lies if the borrower should default; for instance if a French bank’s loan to 
Mexico were guaranteed by a Dutch bank, the loan would be recorded as the Dutch bank’s claim.   
The data on foreign claims I used are taken from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) Consolidated Banking Statistics and are collected at quarterly intervals and on an ultimate 
risk basis.  For total foreign claims, the BIS sums banks’ cross-border claims, the local claims of 
foreign affiliates of the banks in foreign currency, and local claims of foreign affiliates in local 
currency.  Regarding domestic claims, the banking survey statistics of the International Financial 
Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used.  The database collects data 
on aggregate commercial banking institutions’ lending to domestic borrowers for most countries 
at monthly, quarterly, and annual frequency.   There were incomplete data on domestic credit for 
some countries in some periods, but generally there were data for the sample countries and 
sample time span. 
The dependent variable is the government bond yield relative to that of Germany (i.e. the 
yield spread relative to ‘riskless’ Germany).  Ideally, the yield on 10-year government bonds 
would be analyzed following previous studies and as closer representation of the assets investors 
see on the market.  Fortunately, The IMF’s International Financial Statistics provide these data 
for all countries in this sample.  Specifically, they record the simple monthly average of daily 
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secondary market yields on 10 year government bonds, of which I use the value recorded for the 
last month of each quarter. 
Data on the credibility statistics “central government surplus-to-GDP” and “public debt-
to-GDP” are critical to any bond yield investigation.  Ideally, quarterly data would be available 
for both to match the frequency of the dependent variable yield, but the only data available on 
debt-to-GDP were annual.  Therefore, these data were linearly interpolated over the time range to 
expand the number of observations.  Interpolation means interpretation must be made with 
caution, but the debt-to-GDP ratio is a control variable and therefore not essential to the 
hypothesis.  The surplus-to-GDP ratio is taken from the European Central Bank’s (ECB) 
Statistical Warehouse, which keeps these data at quarterly and annual frequency for most 
European countries.  The public debt-to-GDP ratio comes from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s StatExtracts database, and both ratios were made relative to 
Germany by subtracting the contemporaneous ratio for German surplus and debt.   
Variables for liquidity and general risk aversion are also included in the guiding equation.  
These variables would ideally capture the theoretical influence of liquidity premia and any risk 
premia on yields derived from general levels of riskiness in financial markets.  Although 
imperfect, the share of a country’s total bond issuance (in euro) relative to the size of the total 
issuance of near substitutes—other countries’ issuances—will capture liquidity risk.  Quarterly 
data on gross issuances are available from the ECB’s Statistical Warehouse, which I then used to 
compute quarterly securities issued ratios.  The VIX is an indicator of the volatility in U.S. 
equity markets available from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  It is measured as 
the closing price in U.S. dollars on options of the CBOE’s S&P 500 Index fund and is a proxy 
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for the general risk level in financial markets.  Higher prices indicate greater risk aversion.  I 
converted these month-end closing prices to quarterly averages. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics, listing each variable and the associated summary 
statistics.  Of first importance, all variables are converted in percentage point terms for this 
analysis.  There are 11 countries and 32 time periods (quarters) and therefore should be 352 
observations.  Germany’s debt-to-GDP and surplus-to-GDP are not reported in the data for the 
last three periods of the series, however, causing yield spread to have 33 missing values.  
Removing these and several other missing observations, 304 observations were left for analysis.  
The extremely high maximum for the foreign to total claims ratio is reasonable because some 
countries in the sample have small domestic markets but large globalized financial sectors.  
Some countries did not issue any securities in a given period, and therefore the minimum of the 
securities issued ratio is zero. 
 
V. Analysis and Main Results 
 The data constitute a balanced panel with 304 observations, which allows for a wide 
variety of analyses.  A fixed effects regression is the most appropriate technique for the main 
regression.  There are many country specific unobserved effects on yield in the euro zone which 
this type of regression will control, and in addition, the results of the Hausman Specification Test 
confirm this selection.
4
  Before moving further, however, I address the main estimation issues 
arising in this dataset. 
 The first two estimation issues I consider are heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, 
which if present, would decrease the accuracy of statistical significances.  Considering the 
appropriate model as a fixed effects regression, I produce a modified Wald statistic calculated for 
                                                        
4
 Hausman    statistic was 342.34 with a p-Value of 0.00 
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the group of variables, which was unlikely enough that I conclude there is heteroskedasticity.
5
  
Using the Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation to determine the existence of serial correlation, 
the F-statistic of the test was sufficiently improbable that I conclude there is serial correlation in 
the data.
6
  Conveniently, both of these errors are reparable by using robust standard errors, which 
are used for the main estimation and robustness checks.  
 The third estimation I consider is non-stationarity, which if present, would potentially 
cause spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables.  This would 
invalidate the statistical significances of the coefficients.  Using a version of the Dickey-Fuller 
Test, I conclude that the yield spread, relative debt-to-GDP, and VIX index are non-stationary.  
Furthermore, testing the residuals of the fixed effects regression for stationarity, the result 
suggests there is no cointegration among the variables.
7
  To resolve this issue of potential 
spurious correlation, I estimate the equation in first differences (the entire equation for simplicity 
of interpretation).  After changing the specification to a first difference equation, the non-
stationary variables become stationary except for relative debt-to-GDP.  I then analyze its second 
difference and determine it was stationary.  Therefore, the guiding equation becomes the 
following. 
                                            
                                                                     
                                                             
                                   
 
 The last estimation issue I investigate is multicollinearity, which could again result in 
inaccurate hypothesis testing and statistical significance.  The correlation coefficients suggest 
                                                        
5
 The Wald    test statistic (p-Value) was 2409.40 (0.00). 
6
 The Wooldridge F statistic (p-Value) was 938.540 (0.00). 
7
 The Fisher    test statistics (p-Values) for yield spread, relative debt-to-GDP, VIX index, and the residuals were 12.69 
(0.94), 10.87 (0.98), and 22.19 (0.45), and 25.76 (0.26), respectively. 
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that only the VIX index and Crisis dummy are severely correlated.
8
  Calculating variance 
inflation factors, the factors for the VIX index and Crisis dummy were only about two for each. 
Therefore multicollinearity is a moderate estimation issue in this analysis, but both variables will 
remain in the main estimation as guided by theory. 
 Accounting for estimation issues, the main regression is performed following equation 
     above.9  Table 2 presents the results of this regression.  As presented in the table, the 
number of observations used in the estimation is smaller than that in the sample.  This is because 
the calculation of first and second differences necessarily causes the loss of the first observations 
in each variable’s time series. 
 The results show that the coefficient on the Foreign Claims to Total Ratio is negative and 
not statistically significant.  This is surprising in two ways: one, I expect foreign claims to have a 
significant effect on bond yield spreads, and two, I expect a positive sign.  A negative sign 
suggests that increases in the amount of foreign claims a country has actually decreases the 
difference between that country’s bond yields and those of Germany.  One explanation for this 
negative relationship is that, investors may see large amounts foreign claims as a sign banks have 
diversified their lending and therefore risk.  If the particular banking industry’s host country or 
any particular foreign country goes through a severe economic contraction and borrowers default 
on their loans, the banks will still have a large amount of secure claims and can cover their 
losses.  This line of reasoning could be investigated in further research. 
 Relative Debt-to-GDP, the VIX Index, and the Crisis Dummy, are all significant 
variables at the 10-percent level with signs congruent with theory.  An increase of one 
percentage point in relative debt-to-GDP during two previous quarters correlates to an increase 
                                                        
8
 The correlation coefficient was 0.72.  The variance inflation factors for the VIX index and Crisis dummy were 2.10 and 
2.20, respectively. 
9
 Using the xtregar command in Stata, 11
th
 edition. 
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in the yield spread of approximately 0.06 percentage points during the first previous quarter.  
This coefficient is moderately economically significant considering the standard deviation of 
yield spreads presented in Table 1.  The crisis dummy is additionally economically significant 
and the VIX index is of marginal economic significance in this regression, both with positive 
signs.  Lastly, neither the relative surplus-to-deficit or securities issued ratios were significant, as 
I would expect from the theory.  Moreover, the sign of the coefficient on the securities issued 
ratio is positive, contrary to what theory suggests.  One possible explanation is that, given the 
time range of the sample, several euro zone countries with low levels of credibility factors 
increased their debt issuance in an attempt to refinance their governments and take fiscal policy 
measures to stimulate their economies.  Thus larger securities issued ratios come from countries 
with a higher yield spread than would be expected in normal economic times and the correlation 
is positive.  The following section will present robustness checks to verify conclusions from the 
main results. 
 
VI. Robustness Analyses 
 In this section several variations of estimations of bond yield spread are conducted to 
substantiate the conclusions of the main results.  Table 3 presents the results of the first 
robustness check, in which the main regression is repeated, but without the crisis dummy 
variable.  These results show that this alteration of equation [12] has almost no effect on the 
estimated coefficients except that the constant becomes significant.  This is reasonable given that 
the crisis dummy variable had been explaining the drastic shift in bond yield spreads after 
September 2008, and with the removal of the crisis dummy, that variance is likely attributed to 
the constant term. 
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 Table 4 presents several robustness checks using a robust fixed effects regression, which 
uses the within variance of the variables for estimation.  By using this regression technique, 
spurious correlation could be present in the estimation because of non-stationarity in the 
variables.  Nevertheless, it is all the more useful as a robustness check to corroborate the 
evidence from the main regression that the foreign claims ratio is not significant if it is not even 
significant because of spurious correlation.  Regression (i) shows the main results, while 
regression (ii) presents a simple fixed effects estimation of equation [11], the guiding equation 
without differencing.  Regression (iii) estimates the equation when the bond yield spread is 
transformed to its natural log, which might allow a closer fit to the data.  Regression (iv) follows 
the specification of Broos and de Haan (2012) in including relative surplus and debt-to-GDP 
ratios squared.  The log of the securities issued ratio is included instead of the standard securities 
ratio to attempt to achieve a closer fit to the data.  Lastly, regression (v) performs a fixed effects 
regression only for a subsample of data before the fourth quarter of 2008, the first peak in yields 
from the financial crisis in Europe. 
 Throughout all of the fixed effects regressions, the foreign claims ratio is insignificant, 
which corroborates the results of the main estimation.  The relative debt-to-GDP ratio and VIX 
index variables are significant and positive in all estimations except the last, which again 
matches the main results.  Notably in regression (iii) foreign claims does have the hypothesized 
positive sign.  In regression (iv), both the relative surplus and debt-to-GDP ratios squared 
became significant, which suggests a quadratic relationship between them and yield spreads and 
underlines the importance of these factors in the determination of yield spreads.  The constant 
term becomes significant in all of the fixed effects regressions as well, which is especially logical 
in the final regression.  Before the crisis, yield spreads were relatively small, and therefore one 
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constant value can estimate the yield spread accurately.  The change to a negative sign for the 
constant term in the fixed effects regression is likely explained by the crisis.  Since yield spreads 
climb dramatically during the end of the sample, when the financial crisis occurred, it is 
necessary for the y-intercept to be negative in order for the positively sloping estimation line to 
be best-fit.  The first difference of yield spread doesn’t exhibit this extremity and therefore the 
line can be fit with a positive intercept. 
 Table 5 presents a random effects estimation and two pooled regressions.  These 
techniques permit possible spurious correlation, but also provide some insight into the data.  
Regression (i) presents the main results of the differenced equation, while regression (ii) is a 
random effects regression of equation [11].  This is the first regression to find the foreign claims 
ratio as significant and also contrasts with the main results in finding the crisis to be 
insignificant.  The change in the significance of the crisis dummy may be explained by the fact 
that a random effects model uses both within and between variance in the estimation of 
coefficients.  There is likely sufficient variance between countries so as to diminish the crisis 
dummy’s explanatory power for yields.  Furthermore, when including between country variance, 
it appears there is a negative correlation between the foreign claims ratio and bond yields.  Not 
only does this weaken the conclusions of the main results, but it also implies the hypothesis that 
foreign claims increase yields is inaccurate at least in its prediction of the sign of the correlation.   
In regression (iii) a pooled regression is used with equation [11] and foreign claims, 
relative debt-to-GDP, and the crisis dummy again match the main results, while the relative 
surplus-to-GDP and, for the first time, the securities issued ratio, become significant.  The 
securities issued ratio, however, does not have the expected sign, which may result because 
countries with relatively higher debt and deficit levels may have increased their bond issuance 
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during the financial crisis in efforts to stabilize and stimulate their economies, while other 
ostensibly more austere countries issued no more bonds than usual.   
Regression (iv) runs the same regression except it includes an interaction between the 
foreign claims ratio and the crisis dummy to test whether the effect of the foreign claims ratio 
changes in the midst of the financial crisis and subsequent turbulence in the euro zone.  This 
regression finds foreign claims and foreign claims during the crisis to be significant and the sign 
of the foreign claims ratio to be negative, both of which disagree with the main results and 
hypothesis.  The relative surplus-to-GDP and securities issued ratio are also significant while the 
VIX index and crisis dummy lose their significance, contrary to the main regression.  Overall, 
the results of the pooled regressions seem ambiguous regarding the effect of foreign claims on 
bond yield spreads, but corroborate the importance of a country’s debt-to-GDP in determining 
bond yield spreads.  Results also suggest the importance of a country’s surplus-to-GDP and 
securities issued ratio in that determination.  The next section will discuss the conclusions drawn 
from the above analyses. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this study I seek to determine whether a euro zone country’s commercial banks’ 
foreign claims affect the yields of that country’s long-term bonds.  My hypothesis is that higher 
levels of foreign claims would increase a country’s bond yields relative to Germany, a country 
which is considered relatively risk free in the euro zone.  To measure the affect, if any, of foreign 
claims on bond yields, I structured the dependent variable as the spread between the German 10-
year government bond yield and other euro zone countries’ 10-year government bond yields. 
 From the analysis, foreign claims do not have a significant effect on bond yield spreads, 
accounting for other theoretical determinants such as relative debt-to-GDP.  Although in only a 
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few cases of robustness checks is the foreign claims ratio significant, the sign is almost always 
negative, which suggests that even if there were a relationship between foreign claims and yields 
in the euro zone, it would not be a positive one as I hypothesized.  The debt-to-GDP is the most 
persistently significant variable and suggests that increases in a euro zone country’s debt-to-GDP 
relative to Germany will increase its government bond yields relative to Germany’s.  Another 
strong determinant is the VIX volatility index, although the effect is not as consistent. 
 This investigation contributes to the literature by following the direction of Gerlach et al 
(2011) in considering the importance of financial markets in public finance and bond yield 
determination.  Although the results disprove the hypothesis, the literature now has robust 
evidence that a banking sector’s foreign claims do not influence the yields of their host 
government’s bonds.  
 There are several important shortcomings of this analysis and the results it produces.  
Many bond yield investigations rely on data of monthly or even daily frequency, which was not 
available to me in this analysis.  Secondly, studies often will include more than one control 
variable for liquidity and risk aversion, but the data were not available on the additional variables 
the literature suggests for this study.  The time frame of this study is heavily biased by the effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent turmoil in euro zone financial markets. 
 To improve upon this study, there are several directions future research could take.  First, 
the study could be divided in two, where data during and after the crisis at a higher frequency 
could be used to analyze in more depth what variables affect bond yields in each economic 
environment.  Second, another study could attempt to estimate yields directly without the 
framework of a spread comparison with Germany and with a different theoretical approach to 
yield estimation, such as including the financial sector variables of Gerlach et al (2010).  This 
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broader theoretical approach could be brought to data covering more countries and periods to 
investigate why U.S yields are relatively low.  Third, other measures may exist besides 
commercial banks foreign claims to measure the affects of a financial contagion on sovereign 
bond yields, such as the foreign claims of the national governments themselves.  Last, this 
research did find a consistent negative, though insignificant, relationship between the yield 
spread and foreign claims.  With a more complete theory and more frequently recorded data, 
perhaps this relationship could be conclusively determined and quantified. 
 Before the 2008 financial crisis the European Union has tried to impose greater fiscal 
discipline on euro zone members to promote stability and growth and prevent runaway fiscal 
insolvency and sovereign default in its financially weakest members.  One challenge countries 
have faced throughout the crisis to the present is difficulty in raising revenues financed by bond 
issuance.  Based on this investigation’s results, limiting a country’s debt-to-GDP should indeed 
be an effective policy for the European Union to maintain in order to reduce bond yield spreads 
in the euro zone and promote economic harmony and stability. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Independent Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Bond Yield Spread 304 0.512 0.960 -0.57 8.43 
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio 304 0.712 0.190 11.43321 90.20201 
Relative Surplus-to-GDP 304 -1.277 6.030 -34.311 12.27061 
Relative Debt-to-GDP 304 21.477 27.980 -20.979 103.436 
Securities Issued Ratio 304 0.094 0.092 0 34.53159 
VIX Index 304 21.003 9.621 11.19 51.723 
Crisis Dummy (2008:4) 304 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, 
OECD StatExtracts, ECB Statistical Warehouse, CBOE. 
 
 
Table 2: Main Results for Bond Yield Spread 
Independent Variable   
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio -0.00368 
 
(0.00354) 
Relative Surplus to GDP -0.00185 
 
(0.00221) 
Relative Debt-to-DGP 0.0599* 
 
(0.0341) 
Securities Issued Ratio 0.00354 
 
(0.00389) 
VIX Index 0.00625** 
 
(0.00250) 
Crisis Dummy (2008:3) 0.139** 
 
(0.0593) 
Constant 0.0187 
 
(0.0399) 
Observations 276 
Number of Countries 11 
R-squared-Within 0.121 
R-squared-Between 0.3196 
R-squared-Overall 0.1222 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Note: All variables are their first difference except for 
Relative Debt-to-GDP, which is a second difference. 
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Table 3: Difference Estimation Robustness Analysis 
 
Regression Coefficients 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) 
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio -0.00368 -0.00391 
 
(0.00354) (0.00347) 
Relative Surplus to GDP -0.00185 -0.00187 
 
(0.00221) (0.00217) 
Relative Debt-to-DGP 0.0599* 0.0564* 
 
(0.0341) (0.0337) 
Securities Issued Ratio 0.00354 0.00358 
 
(0.00389) (0.00382) 
VIX Index 0.00625** 0.00655*** 
 
(0.00250) (0.00247) 
Crisis Dummy (2008:3) 0.139** - 
 
(0.0593) - 
Constant 0.0187 0.0752** 
 
(0.0399) (0.0347) 
Observations 276 276 
Number of Countries 11 11 
R-squared-Within 0.121 0.0589 
R-squared-Between 0.3196 0.8013 
R-squared-Overall 0.1222 0.0636 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Notes: All variables are a first difference except Relative 
Debt-to-GDP, which is a second difference. (i) Main results, 
(ii) Crisis Dummy removed.  
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Robustness Analyses 
 
Regression Coefficients 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio -0.00368 -0.00565 0.0102 -0.00640 0.0000 
 
(0.00354) (0.00473) (0.0253) (0.00431) (0.0024) 
Relative Surplus to GDP -0.00185 -0.00171 -0.0243 -0.000834 -0.0096 
 
(0.00221) (0.00307) (0.0178) (0.00334) (0.0115) 
Relative Surplus to GDP Squared - - - 0.000403** - 
 
- - - (0.000188) - 
Relative Debt-to-DGP 0.0599* 0.150*** 0.0790* 0.0787*** -0.0018 
 
(0.0341) (0.0120) (0.0418) (0.0119) (0.0022) 
Relative Debt-to-GDP Squared - - - 0.000900*** - 
 
- - - (0.000106) - 
Securities Issued Ratio 0.00354 0.00273 0.0209 - 0.0026 
 
(0.00389) (0.00499) (0.0293) - (0.0031) 
Log of Securities Issued Ratio - - - -0.0316*** - 
 
- - - (0.0115) - 
VIX Index 0.00625** 0.0115*** 0.0293* 0.0128*** 0.0011 
 
(0.00250) (0.00293) (0.0164) (0.00273) (0.0043) 
Crisis Dummy (2008:3) 0.139** -0.177* 0.876* -0.143 - 
 
(0.0593) (0.0988) (0.479) (0.0882) - 
Constant 0.0187 -2.366*** -6.230*** -1.950*** 0.3410*** 
 
(0.0399) (0.0660) (0.774) (0.0878) (0.0796) 
Observations 276 293 293 293 183 
Number of Countries 11 11 11 11 11 
R-squared-Within 0.121 0.3996 0.082 0.5878 0.0119 
R-squared-Between 0.3196 0.2831 0.2141 0.3738 0.2536 
R-squared-Overall 0.1222 0.1399 0.2065 0.2009 0.1007 
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     Notes: (i) Main Results, variables in first or second (if Relative Debt-to-GDP) difference, (ii) robust 
fixed effects, (iii) robust fixed effects using log of bond yield spread, (iv) robust fixed effects with 
relative debt and deficit ratios squared, log of securities issued ratio, (v) robust fixed effects pre-
crisis subsample. 
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Table 5: Random Effects and Pooled Estimation Robustness Analyses 
 
Regression Coefficients 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Foreign Claims to Total Ratio -0.00368 -0.00944* -0.00217 
-
0.00616*** 
 
(0.00354) (0.00499) (0.00156) (0.00168) 
Total Foreign Claims Ratio * Crisis - - - 0.0122*** 
 
- - - (0.00373) 
Relative Surplus to GDP -0.00185 -0.00535 -0.0382*** -0.0408*** 
 
(0.00221) (0.00351) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Relative Debt-to-DGP 0.0599* 0.0507*** 0.00974*** 0.00950*** 
 
(0.0341) (0.00679) (0.00346) (0.00338) 
Securities Issued Ratio 0.00354 0.000929 -0.0168*** -0.0168*** 
 
(0.00389) (0.00560) (0.00425) (0.00425) 
VIX Index 0.00625** 0.0105*** -0.00747 -0.00801 
 
(0.00250) (0.00339) (0.00655) (0.00659) 
Crisis Dummy (2008:3) 0.139** 0.0744 0.763*** -0.106 
 
(0.0593) (0.109) (0.178) (0.211) 
Constant 0.0187 -0.00228 0.447** 0.746*** 
 
(0.0399) (0.443) (0.180) (0.196) 
Observations 276 304 304 304 
Number of Countries 11 11 - - 
R-squared-Within 0.121 0.6038 - - 
R-squared-Between 0.3196 0.2354 - - 
R-squared-Overall 0.1222 0.1616 0.375 0.388 
Standard errors in parentheses   
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    Notes: (i) Main Results, variables in first or second (if Relative Debt-to-GDP) difference, 
(ii) robust random effects, (iii) robust pooled regression, (iv) robust pooled regression 
with interaction. 
 
